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rules the dissent finds this evidence

would have been barred. United
States v. Dalhover, 96 F. (2d) 355
(C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
fendant, Daihover, a member of
That evidence of other unrelated
the notorious Brady gang, plead crimes is not admissible in the trial
guilty to a charge of murder of a of a criminal case, as a general rule,
state policeman while escaping is too well recognized to require
from the robbery of the Goodland elaboration 1 Wigmore, Evidence
State Bank of Goodland, Indiana. (2d ed., 1923) §300; Underhill,
The bank was an insured bank un- Criminal Evidence (3rd ed., 1923)
der 48 Stat. 783 (1934), 12 USCA §150; 1 Jones, Evidence, (1913)
§588c, and as such the defendant §145. However, there are certain
came under Federal jurisdiction; times when crimes other than the
this act provided that on trial both one for which the defendant is bethe guilt and the punishment were ing tried are related to the crime
to be matters for jury considera- of the indictment so that evidence
tion. Dalhover admitted after his of them is within the legitimate
capture that he and his two cohorts field of evidence to be considered;
had in their careers robbed ap- i. e., where two or more crimes are
proximately 150 stores, 4 jewelry part of one transaction. Miller v.
stores, and 3 banks previous to the State, 13 Okla. Cr. 176, 163 Pac. 131
Goodland robbery. The issue on (1917); where it is necessary to
appeal was whether evidence of complete the res gestae. Gibson v.
these previous crimes, readily con- State, 14 Ala. App. 111, 72 So. 210
fessed by the defendant, was prop- (1916); where motive need be
erly admissible in the proceedings shown. State v. Martin, 47 Ore.
before the jury to determine the 282, 83 Pac. 849 (1906); where the
punishmnt. The majority of the identity of the accuser is in quescourt ruled that this evidence was tion, Romes v. Commonwealth, 164
perfectly proper. A strong dissent Ky. 334, 175 S. W. 669 (1915); to
contended that the proceedings rebut a defense or alibi. People
should be conducted under the v. Mandrell, 306 Ill. 413, 138 N. E.
rules of evidence which would have 215 (1923) or in particular classes
applied if the proceedings were a of crimes such as sex crimes to
trial to determine guilt; under such show inclination. Lefforge v. State,
PREVIOus CRIMES UPON ISSUED DEGREE OF PUNISHMENT WHERE TRIAL
Is BEFORE A JURY.- [Federal] De-

[883]
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129 Ind. 551, 29 N. E. 34 (1891).
In the instant case there is no contention that this evidence of these
other hundred odd crimes is so related to the murder that it is therefore within proper bounds. Rather
the opinion concludes that since
the guilt of the defendant has been
determined by the plea of guilty
there is no need of the rigorous exclusion of evidence of this type.
The rule requiring exclusion of
this kind of evidence finds its reason for being in certain "Auxiliary
General Principles of Policy";
namely: 1. unaue prejudice might
be caused by taking it into consideration; 2. unfair surprise would
handicap the defense; 3. confusion
of issues would result. 1 Wigmore,
Evidence §29a, Wharton, Criminal
Evidence (11th ed., 1935) §344.
The court argued that since the
guilt had been determined and
since it is merely a question of
meting out the punishment, this
evidence might be admitted. They
evidently felt that the "Principles
of Policy" were all matters applicable in the determination of guilt
but are no longer pertinent once
guilt is determined.
Under the common law, the court
prescribed the punishment; even
in instances where alternative punishments were provided, the question was for the court's discretion.
Bishop, Criminal Law (9th ed.
1923) §934. But in some situations
the jury is given a voice in the fixing of the punishment. Ark. Stat.
4039; Ariz. Rev. Code (1928) §4585;
Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1936) §1136; Mo.
Stat. (1929) c. 29, Art. 13, §3703;
Ohio Stat. (Baldwin, 1934) §12400;
Tex. Code of Cr. Proc. (Vernon,
1936) Art. 502; Va. Stat. (Michie,
1936) §4784. This procedure of
having the jury fix the punishment, however, has not been with-
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out its critics. Kerr, A Needed Reform in Criminal Procedure, 6 Ky.
L. Rev. 107 (1918); Fuller, Criminal Justice in Virginia, pp. 133,
139, 161 (1931); 24 Va. L. Rev. 463
(1937). Such criticism would well
lead one to question the feasibility
of this type of process.
In cases where the court is the
body which imposes the sentence
it seems to be a generally accepted
practice that evidence of other offenses may be taken in consideration by the court in determining
the sentence. 86 A. L. R. 833; 8
R. C. L. §269; 3 Wharton, Criminal
Procedure (10th ed. 1918) §1890;
Peterson v. United States, 246 Fed.
18 (C. C. A. 4th, 1917); Meyers v.
People, 65 Colo. 450, 177 Pac. 145
(1918); People v. Popescue, 345 Ill.
142, 177 N. E. 739 (1931). The rule
obviously is different from that applied to evidence heard to determine guilt. People v. McWilliams,
348 Ill. 333, 180 N. E. 832 (1933).
The leading authority cited in the
principal case upholding the contention that this evidence is properly in the scope of the jury's consideration in setting the sentence is
the Illinois case, People v. Popescue, supra. In that case there was
a cause tried before a judge on a
plea of guilty to a murder charge.
"The only question is whether the
trial judge erred in hearing evidence of other crimes before exercising his statutory discretion in
fixing the degree of punishment."
The court held in that particular
case that this evidence was properly to be considered. But the
opinion points out that the results
might be different if the jury were
the body to determine the punishment. Thus the Popescue case,
which is the only case cited to uphold this conclusion in the noted
case would seem to be distinguished
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from the very situation for which instead of a life term. Reppin v.
it is cited as precedent. More- People, 95 Colo. 192, 34 P. (2d) 71
over there are other features by (1934). The court says in People
which the cases are distinguishable v. Corry, 349 Ill. 122, 181 N. 5. 603
There the evidence of these other (1932) that where the punishment
crimes was not unrelated, but was may vary, "the accused had the
found relevant to the crime for right not only to have his guilt or
which the defendant was being innocence of the particular charge
tried; it served to rebut the defense determined free from the prejudithat the killing was accidental and cial effect of incompetent evidence,
as such would come within the ex- but also to have his punishment,
ceptions previously considered and when found guilty of the crime
would be good evidence even on charged, fixed solely with reference
trial. People v. Folignos, 322 Ill. to the facts and circumstances of
Also that crime, excluding from the
304, 153 N. E. 373 (1926).
the court was conducting a hearing process of making such decision,
under an Illinois Statute, Ill. Rev. the consideration of other indeStat. (1937) c. 38, §732, which pendent and unrelated offenses."
On the basis of these cases to
makes it mandatory if requested by
the State or by the defendant that which there seem to be few excepevidence in mitigation or aggrava- tions one might conclude that this
tion be heard. People v. Penning- evidence was wrongly admitted for
jury consideration. Certainly there
ton, 267 Ill. 45, 107 N. E. 871 (1915).
Can we reason by analogy and is little authority in the instant
conclude that since the judge can case which would serve as precedhear evidence of other offenses in ent for the conclusion reached. It
determining punishment in criminal seems to be the rule that where the
trials, therefore a jury is able to do court is fixing the sentence after
likewise? As a rule it does not the guilt has been determined, .it
seem that this evidence is admis- can consider these other evidences.
sible for the jury's consideration. But where the determining body is
Procedure, the jury most decisions rule that
Wharton,
Criminal
§1890. In a situation nearly iden- this evidence would prejudice the
tical with that in the principal case resilting punishment and therefore
the court held that the defendant only incidents directly connected
had a right to have his punishment with the charge should be allowed
fixed with reference only to the to influence the final conclusion.
circumstances of the crime of which This difference in rules seems to
he has been found guilty. If this be an inconsistency in our criminal
evidence has been admitted it is not practice, not to be justified on the
possible for the court to say that basis of the superior sense of judgthe jury in sentencing hasn't been ment which a court possesses as
prejudiced by this evidence. Far- compared with a lay jury. Rather
ris v. People, 129 Ill. 521, 21 N. E. the difference in rules goes deeper
821 (1889); People v. Meisner, 311 so as to involve considerations of
Ill. 40, 142 N. E. 482 (1924); Peo- entirely different fields in deterple v. Hefferman, 312 Ill. 66, 143 N. mining the punishment the accused
E. 411 (1924); it might close the must suffer. For the same crime
jury's mind to any lenience and the judge in sentencing could scan
cause them to fix a death penalty the whole character and past con-
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duct of the accused; but the jury
would be limited to the relatively
narrow scope of incidents directly
related to the one crime of the
indictment. It truly seems to be
a double standard; one for the
judge, another for the jury. This
case, if followed, would establish
a uniform rule to be followed by
both the judge and jury by letting
them both consider the same fields.
The decision, however, has not supported its conclusion on the basis
of precedent cases, nor has it justified the result by considerations
of policy.
If one is to desire uniformity in
method of arriving at the punishment, whichever process is elected
should be chosen only after consideration of the larger question of
criminology of what purpose the
punishment is to serve. That the
historical basis of punishment arose
from an attitude of vengeance is
a truism which to the sociologist
requires little explanation. MacDougal defines the origin of punishment as "the binary compound
of anger and positive self feeling."
Even today that vengeance theory
is the basis of the attitude that
many lay persons have toward the
-treatment of the criminal. But to
most criminologists such an attitude
is too much like a debtor-creditor
agreement where the criminal, by
suffering his punishment which
corresponds to the price to be paid
for that particular breach of the
rules of *society, again gains the
right to commit another crime.
Such, it would seem would be the
result of attempting to isolate the
facts of the one particular crime
and render a corresponding punishment. This leaves no room for
any play of mitigation or aggravation but is rather an eye for eyetooth for tooth doctrine. This is

the conclusion one must sustain if
they are to argue for exclusion of
other evidence in determining the
punishment.
Rather it would seem that the
ultimate purpose of imprisonment
is to protect society and the lives of
its members. To reach this end,
the punishing body could more aptly consider facts of deterrence of
the commission of crime and the
prevention or restraint of it in the
future. Statistics support the general supposition that a habitual
criminal is more likely to commit
crimes in the future than is a first
offender. Glueck and Glueck, Five
Hundred Criminal Careers (1933)
250-251. Certainly it would seem
that these previous elements of
other crimes which furnish a background for the criminal and to an
extent determine his moral turpitude, and do admittedly correlate
with the record he will probably
have in the future, should be considered in punishing the person
guilty of the crime.
With this in mind it would seem
that the conclusion in the instant
case could be supported on doctrines taken from the fields of criminology and sociology: that punishment determined with consideration of former crimes would be
more apt to bring a result nearer
the ends of justice.
HAROLD CALKINS.

ABORTION-ATTEMPT TO ABORT A
NON-PREGNANT WOMAN - DYING
DECLARATIONS. - [Illinois]
The
well-nigh impossible task of upholding a conviction in abortion
cases on appeal was again demonstrated in a recent decision of the
Illinois Supreme Court. People v.
Holmes, 369 Il1. 624, 17 N. E. (2d)
562 (1938). That case, however,
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is of interest, not necessarily because of the above fact, but because
of the law which the Supreme
Court refused to decide. Delivering ari opinion without citing a
case, the court reversed the conviction without remanding on two
grounds.
The first ground for reversal was
based on the admission by the trial
judge of the deceased woman's oral
dying declaration. On May 10, 1938,
Grace Christensen, the deceased,
told hospital authorities that when
she knew she was near death she
would make a statement. On May
15, 1938, without any solicitation on
the part of the hospital authorities
she said she wished to make a
statement as she knew she was going to die. She repeated this several times, and accused the defendant of being responsible for her
condition. The hospital authorities,
in transcribing her statement substituted their language for hers,
and the trial judge held this written
statement inadmissible on the
ground that it was not in the words
of the deceased woman. The oral

statements

of Mrs. Christensen,

from which the written statement
was taken, however, were admitted
into evidence, and this admission
the Supreme Court ruled erroneous, stating; one, that the record
failed to establish that the deceased
had given up all hope of living
when she made the written declaration; two, that at no time was
deceased ever told by her physicians or other qualified persons she
was going to die; and three, that
the genesis of both the oral and
written statements was the desire
of the hospital to obtain an exculpatory statement to absolve it from
any blame in her death. The court
claims the statement was essentially one of exoneration for the
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hospital, not one of incrimination
of the defendant.
These propositions can be shortly
answered. First, the court confuses
the written declaration which was
not admitted and the oral declaration which was held admissible.
Aside from this, however, the record is replete with statements by
Mrs. Christensen that she knew she
was going to die. That she entertained such a belief is strengthened
by the fact that on May 10th she
postponed making any statement
until she was certain she was near
death, and subsequently on May
15th, made the declaration saying
she knew she was dying. As early
as May 4th, the record shows, the
deceased woman had declared herself near death and had made plans
for- her own funeral. Statements
such as these are more than enough
to satisfy the Illinois rule, laid
down in People v. Cassesse, 251 Ill.
422, 425, 96 N. E. 274 (1911), that
the evidence must show the declarant entertained a fixed belief and
a moral conviction that his death
was impending, that he had no hope
of recovery, that he despaired of
life and looked upon death as inevitable and at hand. Secondly,
there is no mention in the above
rule of the necessity of a plysicians
warning as to impending death. To
the contrary, in People v. Zachary,
310 Ill. 351, 141 N. E. 732 (1923),
the Illinois court held that to make
a dying declaration it was not necessary for any physician to be present. Whether this is still the rule
in Illinois we cannot be certain, for
the court in the instant case has
not met the issue squarely or clearly, but only intimates that this may
no longer be the rule. Thirdly, the
court's theory that the statement is
one of exoneration is completely
exploded by the fact that there is
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no showing in the record that there
was any persuasion on the part of
the hospital authorities. Had there
been any effort on the part of the
hospital authorities to obtain the
statement, the court's point would
still not have been well taken. People v. Borella, 312 Ill. 34, 43, 143
N. E. 447 (1924) enunciated the
doctrine that such statements may
be solicited by officials.
The court also stresses the fact
that the deceased lived eleven days
after making her declaration. It is
interesting to note that in People
v. Kreutzer, 354 Ill. 430, 188 N. E.
422 (1933), the declarant lived nine
days after making her declaration,
and in People v. Cassesse (supra)
the declarant actually lived thirtyfive days after the statement was
made.
As a second ground for reversal,
the Court, completely misunderstanding the theory of the People
as to just how the deceased woman
came to her death, rule that the
expert medical testimony for the
State did not over-balance such
testimony for the defense. It is apparent from an examination of the
briefs of both the People and the
defendant that each contended Mrs.
Christensen died from a general
peritonitis which resulted from the
rupture of a tubo-ovarian abscess.
The State argued the rupture was
caused by the insertion of the instrument used in the attempted
abortion. The defendant claimed
the rupture was either spontaneous
or that it was caused after defendant had treated her, by an operation performed by deceased's physicians in an effort to save her life.
The court seemingly was under the
impression that the defense alone
recognized the previous existence
of the abscess and that the People
were contending the abscess itself

RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
was caused by the insertion of the
instrument in the attempt to procure the abortion. The court,
t hrefore. reversed without a necessary understanding of the arguments that were made.
The court, reversing on the above
two grounds left undecided a point
of law which has long been argued.
The defendant, who was not a physician and shown by other testimony in the record to have made a
practice of performing abortions for
money, was charged with murder
by attempting to procure a miscarriage on a woman who was not
pregnant.
The indictment was
drawn under the statute relative to
abortion, Ill. Rev. Stats. 1937, Ch.
38, Sec. 3, which reads: "Whoever,
by means of any instrument, medicine, drug or other means whatever, causes any woman pregnant
with child, to abort, or miscarry,
or attempts to procure or produce
an abortion or miscarriage, unless
the same were done as necessary
for the preservation of the mother's
life, shall be imprisoned in the
penitentiary not less than one year
nor more than ten years; or if the
death of the mother results therefrom, the person procuring or causing the abortion or miscarriage
shall be guilty of murder." 1874,
March 27, R. S. 1874, p. 348, div. 1,
sec. 3. That the statute does cover
murder by attempted abortion as
decided in Clark v. People, 224 Ill.
554, 79 N. E. 941 (1906), the defendant does not deny, but does argue that because of the impossibility of performing an abortion or
an attempted abortion on a woman
not pregnant she could not be convicted under this indictment.
The defense contends that before
a crime can be committed under
this statute the act would have to
be done, in the language of the
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statute, on a woman "pregnant with
child." They say the party shall be
guilty of murder only "if the death
of the mother results therefrom"
(italics supplied), and cite, in support of this contention, the case of
Howard v. People, 185 Ill. 552, 57
N. E. 441 (1900). In that case the
Illinois court held the word
"mother" in section 3 (supra)
meant a woman pregnant with
child.
There
the
indictment
charged the defendant with murder
by abortion on a woman pregnant
with child, and the court, faced
only with the problem of the sufficiency of the indictment, held it
good saying that a woman pregnant
with child is a "mother" as used in
Section 3 (supra). The case is distinguishable on this point, the court
not having considered or faced the
problem of the instant case.
The argument in answer to defendant's contention is that of legislative intent. By no stretch of the
imagination does it seem possible
the legislature intended this statute
to be used as a means of escape
from one of the crimes it was attempting to prevent. Even on the
grounds of statutory interpretation
there is an answer to the argument
of the defense. It will be observed
that Section 3 embraces two offenses, that of abortion, and that of
attempt to abort. Of course, to
constitute the crime of completed
abortion the woman must be pregnant, and the phrase "woman pregnant with child" is found in that
part of the statute which deals with
that crime. These words are significantly absent from the part of
the statute dealing with the crime
of attempted abortion. The more
sensible construction is that the
word "mother" as used in Section
3 was merely intended to describe
the person on whom the abortion
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was attempted, and not that the
intent of the legislature was to exclude an act of this kind from the
statute.
This contention of the defense
was squarely met in the case of
People v.Huff, 339 Ill. 328,171 N. E.
261 (1930), which was reversed because of an error in the indictment.
Although reversing, the court said
on page 333; "It is not necessary
to allege she was pregnant. It
would be impossible to procure a
miscarriage if she were not, but it
was not necessary to the making of
the attempt that she should be
pregnant. An attempt may be made
to commit a crime which it is impossible for the person making the
attempt to commit because of the
existence of conditions of which he
is ignorant." The court, in that
case, went on to say that the defendant cannot take advantage of
a fact of which he did not know.
This is certainly the better reasoned argument. It is not conceivable that a defendant, with every
other element of the crime present,
should go free because of the absence of a foetus. Whatever else
it did,. the Illinois Court should
have at least discussed and decided
this question. It is to be remembered that the Huff case was reversed on other grounds, and without a distinct holding on the point
the question is still a fairly open
one in Illinois.
Nowhere in the record is there
any denial by the defendant that
she did not perform any of the acts
of which she is accused in the dying declaration. There was testimony at the trial to show she made
a practice of performing abortions.
She was not qualified in any way
for the practice of medicine or surgery. Under all these facts there
can be no justification for a crime
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such as this, yet the court gave her
her freedom after she had been
convicted by a jury of a crime
which she did not deny. There was
sufficient basis both on the law in
Illinois and the facts of the case for
a decision affirming the conviction.
It is clear the court should have
settled the law on this subject in
such a way as to leave no doubt
as to how it stood in future cases
concerning like situations. By refusing to meet the issue squarely
the court has only succeeded in
confusing the law as to dying declarations. Whichever way the court
ruled, a firm decision was needed
to clarify the law, thus insuring a
greater opportunity for the granting of justice, and a saving in time
and money for the people of the

state.
PETER WnsoN.

STAMPS-

OBLIGATION

OR

OTHER

SEcumY-C-mTmEITING.- [Federal] In an action of libel, the
United States seized, and attempted
to have forfeited a stamp catalogue
which had been imported from
Switzerland through the mails.
This book had, on its face, an illustration of a Swiss postage stamp in
green and within its covers were
black and white reproductions of
foreign stamps. The government
contended that the book was illegal
because the stamps were reproduced in violation of sections 220,
172 and 161 of the Criminal Code.
The District Court ultimately rests
its decision on sec. 161, and determines that the illustrations were
not obligations or securities within
the meaning of that act; and that
the catalogue was not subject to
seizure. United States v. One Zumstein Briefmarken Katalog, 24 F.
Supp. 516 (D. C. E. D. Pa., 1938).

Sec. 220 of the Code forbids anyone from knowingly using any
forged or counterfeited stamps of
any foreign government. Knowledge or belief of its counterfeit
character is an essential part of
obligations.
passing
counterfeit
Zottarelli v. United States, 20 F.
(2d) 795 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927); Hagan v. United States, 295 Fed. 656
(C. C. A. 6th, 1924). Since intent
is so necessary, and the government readily conceded that there
was none here, this section as well
as section 172, wherein there is a
like requirement, are inapplicable,
and the District Court finds them
SO.
Penetrating the somewhat confused arguments of counsel for the
United States, we see that the issue
is presented by an interpretation
of sec. 161, viz., is a foreign stamp
an obligation or other security of a
foreign government within the
meaning of the Act? The pertinent provisions of that section prohibit the selling, printing or importing of "any counterfeit plate
. . . engraving, print, obligation, or
other security of any foreign government." It is quite obvious that
these stamps are neither counterfeit plates, engravings., or prints. If
the act is to have applicability at
all, it will be in analyzing the connotation of "obligations." There is
a decided dearth of cases dealing
with the definition and interpretation of these terms. A search produced but two cases involving that
section. Both cases are cited in
the court's opinion, and the dissent
of one, Biddle v. Luvisch, 287 Fed.
699 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923), is relied
on heavily. In that case, the question arose on the sufficiency of an
indictment charging a violation of
section 161, and involving Canadian
excise stamps. Defendant pleaded
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guilty, and the court held that un-

der that plea, he had admitted the
allegations that the stamps were
obligations or securities of that
country, and that this relieved the
government from proving a foreign
law, of which courts could not take
judicial notice. At pp. 701, 702, the
Dissent held that the indictment
had assumed that the stamps were
obligations and had charged a
counterfeit of them; but, a stamp
shows on its face that it is not such
an obligation, and to say that it
-might be would be to import into
our law a foreign law as a n'ew
element of defining a crime. Foreign stamps are not expressly included in the statute as "obligations or other securities"; since
they are not so included, and since
Congress could have included them,
a contrary implication arises. See
also United States v. Luvisch, 17 F.
(2d) 200 (D. C. E. D. Mich. 1927).
The fact situations in the principal case, and in the Biddle case,
supra, are so dissimilar, however,
that the decision in the latter,
though helpful, is far from controlling.
A great deal, of course, depends
on the definition of the terms in
the dispute. Webster's New InternationalDictionary, 2d edition, defines the words in question as follows: a "stamp" is "evidence that
the government's dues are paid";
an "obligation" is a "formal and
binding agreement or acknowledgment
of a liability to pay a certain
.sum or
do a certain thing"; a "security" is "an evidence of debt or
of property, as a bond, stock certificate . . .; a document giving

the holder the right to demand and
receive property not in his posession."
Examining sec. 161 more closely,
can we say that the words "other

securities" have a special significance, and that they should be construed so as to include stamps
which were not specifically set forth
in the act? To do this-to give
them a flexible meaning in which
they would operate as a "catch-all"
-would seem to contravene, if not
repudiate, the doctrine "ejusdem
generis," that is when general
words follow the enumeration of
particular things, or persons, the
general words will be construed as
applying only to persons or things
of the same general nature as those
enumerated; this rule is especially
applicable to penal statutes. 59 C.
J., sec. 581, and cases there cited.
The words "other securities" are
words of a general character, and
under the doctrine just enunciated
we may conclude that "other security" means things of the same
general nature as "obligation"; a
stamp, even though an "other security," is hot a promise to pay or
do something but is rather dues for
a governmental service.
The stamps in the case at bar were
illustrations included in a stamp
catalogue, and were definitely not
to be lased for any other than philatelic purposes. Such a situation
as this seemed to be realized as
conceivable by Congress. Proponents of the Act of March 3, 1923,
42 Stat. 1437, argued that since
there was a large group of philatelists in the country, and that
number was continually increasing,
that something be done to permit
them to increase their activities by
allowing them to issue and collect
defaced stamps. The Act allowed
printing and publishing of black
and white illustrations of foreign
stamps "from plates so defaced as
to indicate (they) are not adapted
or intended for use as stamps, or
to prevent or forbid making of nec-
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essary plates therefor for use in
philatelic . . . articles or albums."
This act was a boon to stamp collectors; but, more was to come. The
above act's amending act of Jan. 27,
1938, 56 Stat. 6, provided that
"nothing in secs. 161, 172, and 220
of the Criminal Code . . . shall be
construed to forbid or prevent . . .
importation . . .for philatelic purposes . . .of black and white illus(1) foreign revenue
trations of:
stamps if from plates so defaced as
to indicate illustrations are not
adapted or intended for use as
stamps; (2) foreign postage stamps."
Unless indicated otherwise, the
amended statute should be construed as though the original had
been repealed and the new act
adopted in its amended form. Applying these principles to the situation at bar, there is little doubt
but that the legislation intended to
permit these black and white illustrations to be made; this the government's counsel graciously concedes. And this whether the stamps
were or were not obligations of a
foreign power. In view of these
two acts the court's discussion of
sec. 161 in this connection seems
rather meaningless, although informative. But, as the Amending
Act of 1938 was not passed until
after this case was in litigation, a
good explanation appears.
There remain but the two other
kinds of stamps to be disposed of;
the colored illustration on the cover,
and some black and white illustrations of revenue stamps within.
The District Court holds that
though not coming within the ex-
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emption of the Amending act, still,
since they weren't obligations or
securities of a foreign country or
counterfeits, their importation for
philatelic purposes is not prohibited.
It is rather difficult to believe
that the government was serious in
prosecuting-what appears to have
been its purpose was to present this
as a test case. Counsel for the
United States seems to have made
half-hearted attempts to throw out,
without any well-conceived plan,
some sections of the Code; and, instead of pursuing his contentions,
be either conceded that he was in
the wrong, or failed to press his line
of attack. Apart from this, we cannot see how the Court could, under
these conditions, have decided that
these were "obligations." We hasten to add that we do not contend
that stamps could never be obligations of a government, for that
has been decided otherwise. In 20
0. A. G. 691, and 27 0. A. G. 125,
the Attorneys-General said: "that
postage stamps are not obligations
of the United States, except so long
as they remain uncancelled." In
this case, there is a different consideration. The stamps were reproduced in black and white and
were solely for philatelic purposes;
and, since there is no danger of
their being used for any other purpose, we seriously doubt whether
Congress would prevent their importation, even though they were
obligations. This position is confirmed by the Amending act of 1938
which allowed exactly that.
SELWYN COLEMAN.

